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Abstract 
Two different strands of literature have analysed the role of socio-economic factors in explaining 
the differential growth performance of the EU regions and the impact of structural funds on such 
performance. This paper aims at combining these strands of literature by directly comparing the 
(lack of) socio-economic preconditions for successful  regional development with the correlated 
allocation of structural funds. In order to reach this objective the spatial distribution of both the 
sources of  socio-economic disadvantage and the regional allocation of  structural funds  will be 
compared,  thus uncovering a potential inconsistency between policy objectives ( favouring 
disadvantaged areas) and the beneficiaries of the funds.  In a ddition,  an empirical model 
(specifically an Heckman two-step selection model) to assess to what extent regional funds are, in 
fact, associated (in a statistically significant way) with the above-mentioned sources of competitive 
“di-advantage” is developed. The paper shows that the sources of disadvantage are more spatially 
concentrated than the funds devoted to compensating such disadvantage. The weak association 
between structural disadvantage and EU funds suggests a potential explanation for the reduced 
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1.0 Introduction 
The debate over the  EU budget 2007-2013 made clear the need for  an in-depth understanding of 
the structure and the impact of the EU development funds.  The scarce resources available need to 
be targeted more effectively towards the real requirements of EU countries and regions in order to 
deliver the expected benefits. R egional development policies have become even more important 
after  the enlargement of the European Union which  has, on one hand, reduced the available 
resources in comparison to the target areas and, on the other, heightened economic disparities 
between the member states.  However, the urgency for a  highly cost/effective EU development 
policy should take account of the evidence, provided by a number  of empirical studies, of a very 
limited or even insignificant impact of  structural fund expenditure on the economic performance of 
the assisted areas. Empirical evidence of an impact by the structural expenditure is so weak as to 
induce Boldrin and Canova (2001) to conclude that: “regional and structural policies serve mostly a 
redistributional purpose, motivated by the nature of the political equilibria upon which the European 
Union is built”. Conversely, an appropriate counterfactual  scenario (”what would have happened 
without an active regional policy?  Could inequalities possibly have risen even more?”)  while 
crucial for such a policy assessment is very  hard to construct and heavily dependent upon its 
underlying assumptions. 
On the basis of such considerations this paper has adopted a different perspective by  focusing its 
attention upon the “a priori” structure of the policy rather than on its impact. Consequently this 
paper analyses the regional allocation of the EU f unds in order to assess whether (and to what 
extent) it is consistent  with the factors that have  been  shown to hamper the local economy’s 
capability to grow and develop at an adequate pace. In order to reach this objective this paper aims 
at bringing together two separate strands of literature: the literature on the analysis of the regional 
policies of the EU  and that on the role of underling socio-economic conditions in the explanation of 
differential regional growth performance.  While the results of some of the former are biased by the 
abovementioned counterfactual problem, the latter has been rarely fully exploited to draw direct 
economic policy implications.  This paper aims at filling the gap between these two strands of 
literature by directly comparing the socio-economic preconditions for successful  regional 
development  with the correlated allocation of structural funds. On the basis  of the evidence 
provided by the literature and in order to maximise its chance of success, the EU regional funds 
should be allocated according to the geography of such sources of competitive disadvantage. In 
other words,  given that a set of socio-economic conditions have been proven responsible for 
hampering the economic success of many EU regions, the EU funds should be allocated in order to   3 
“compensate” the structural disadvantage of  the assisted areas. However, the “redistributional 
purposes” needed by the “political market” equilibrium can “dilute” the targeting of the funds and 
thus  produce an a priori reduction in the effectiveness of the policy (irrespective of the 
counterfactual used to assess its impact).  
This paper aims at assessing precisely this potential bias in the geographical allocation of the 
structural funds  (Objective 1 and 2)  under both the 1994-1999 a nd 2000-2006 programming 
periods in order to shed some light on the coherence of the policy pursued up to now and draw 
some implication for the forthcoming programming period.  
More specifically, in this paper:  
a)  the spatial concentration of structural expenditure as an important prerequisite for its 
effectiveness is analysed. A low degree of spatial concentration of development funds may 
support the hypothesis of a distribution based on political equilibrium rather than 
effectiveness; 
b)  the spatial concentration of EU funds is contrasted with a specifically developed indicator of 
socio-economic disadvantage of the EU regions. This analysis will allow us to investigate 
the coherence of the EU regional policies with regard to the structural disadvantage of EU 
regions thus uncovering a potential inconsistency between policy objectives (favouring 
disadvantaged areas) and the beneficiaries of the funds; 
c)   an empirical model to assess to what extent regional funds are, in fact, associated (in a 
statistically significant way) with the above-mentioned sources of competitive “di-
advantage” is developed. 
 
This paper is organized into three sections. In the first section we briefly review some of the most 
relevant literature of the two strands that we are attempting to join in our empirical analysis in order 
to highlight their synergies and set the foundation for a subsequent analysis. In the second section 
we present  the methodology followed to assess the spatial structure of both funds and socio-
economic disadvantage and outline our empirical model to measure the adherence of such funds to 
the latter factor. In the third section the empirical results are discussed together with some 
implications for the design of regional policies.    4 
2.0 Regional policy and structural disadvantage 
2.1 The EU regional development policy, its objectives and the controversy over its effects 
 
The Treaty Establishing the European Community in 1958 stated that “(…) the Community shall 
aim at reducing the disparities between the levels of development of the various regions and the 
backwardness of the least favoured regions or islands, including rural areas”  (Article 158). The 
same objective was restated almost half a century later by the EU draft Constitution (article III-
220).  
The financial resources devoted to pursue this objective have grown substantially over the years. 
From the Brussels European Council in 1988, which allocates ECU 68 billion (at 1997 prices) to 
structural funds, to the Edinburgh European Council in 1993 which allocates almost ECU  177 
billion (at 1999 prices) for the same purpose, the contributions to regional funds have grown from 
€8 billion per year in 1989 to €32 billion per year in 1999.  After the Berlin European Council’s 
reform of the structural funds the expenditure was adjusted to  €28 billion per year between 2000 
and 2006, i.e. €195 billion over seven years
1 (all at 1999 prices) (European Commission website).  
Altogether the expenditure for regional policy  is particularly significant when assessed as a 
percentage of the  GDP of many lagging regions: 2.7% (of national  GDP) in Greece, 2.8% in 
Portugal, 1% in Spain, 0.7% in Ireland in the year 2000 (E.C. 2000).  
However, while the amount of resources devoted to the objective of promoting an “ overall 
harmonious development” of the Union has not been negligible, the evidence of the influence of 
such resources on the actual level of territorial cohesion of the EU is rather mixed.  In particular the 
literature has emphasized: 
a)  the lack of upward mobility of Objective 1 regions, which have remained almost the same 
from 1989 to 2005 (with the only exception of Abruzzo
2). 
b)  the absence of convergence across EU regions in contrast with that observed across the 
member states which dominated the past twenty-five years of the European growth  history 
(Boldrin and Canova, 2001;  Magrini, 1999; Puga, 2002). Rather, a process of “club 
convergence” would be in place across the  Eu regions thus leading to the formation of 
clusters of regions with persistently different income levels (Canova, 2004; Quah 1996 and 
1997). 
                                                 
1 In addition the Cohesion Fund distributes resources for about €2.5 billion per year from 2000 to 2006, for a total of 
€18 billion (at 1999 prices). 
 
2 Only Abruzzo in Italy lost its Objective 1 status in 1997.   5 
On the basis of such evidence, which is undoubtedly the results of a complex set of forces in place 
in the EU economy, many of which not related to any policy action, some empirical studies have 
attempted to single out  the link between structural funds and regional economic development in 
order to assess their impact (if any) on the regional economy.  
These contributions focused  upon different f actors which seem to prevent regional policy from 
delivering its intended benefits. Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman (2002)’s analysis highlights the 
distortion produced by structural funds on the location decision of R&D intensive firms. Structural 
funds provide an incentive for firms to locate in assisted regions with a poor endowment of human 
capital,  thus producing an inefficient outcome for both firms (that cannot benefit from an adequate 
labour pool in the local area) and workers (who do not benefit from an increase in labour demand 
due to skill mismatch). Thus, EU aid should be focused “on helping regions change their 
endowments and specialize according to the resulting comparative advantage” (p.352).  Though 
produced in differential theoretical frameworks
3, t his evidence is not far from the results of 
Cappelen et al. (2003). who concluded that impact of structural funds is positive but  “crucially 
dependent on the receptiveness of the receiving environment” (p.640).  These findings emphasize 
the role of relatively more favourable contextual conditions/endowment which lead to a paradoxical 
situation whereby the EU funds fail to work precisely where they are most needed.  
Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi (2004) by  more directly  assessing the impact of structural funds on 
regional growth performance, find that such  impact crucially depends on the distribution of 
resources across axes.  Where fund allocation more closely addresses such contextual conditions, 
i.e. by being channelled towards human capital enhancement, its effects tend to be positive and 
significant while this is not the case when other objectives are pursued (i.e. infrastructure).  
However, in addition and “in combination” with the underlying socio-economic conditions, the 
spatial structure of the funds is relevant in terms of the maximisation of their impact: not only is the 
level of expenditure in the objective region itself  relevant but also that in its neighbouring regions 
(Dall’Erba, 2005). By this we mean that the spatial externalities produced by the implementation of 
regional development programmes of whatever nature need to be taken  into account as  an 
insufficient spatial “concentration” of the funds may reduce their impact by reducing the amount of 
such externalities “flowing” within the assisted areas.  
Thus, the evidence briefly reviewed above suggests that different kinds of “mismatches” might be a 
cause for the weak impact of the  investments pursued up to now.  Consequently we find 
“operational” mismatches between policy targets and the real needs of the lagging regions when 
financial resources are divided among the different axes and then translated into concrete actions 
                                                 
3 While Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman (2002) focuses the determinants of firms’ location Cappelen et al. (2003) 
develop a “new growth theory” model with a Schumpeterian perspective.   6 
and “spatial” mismatches between areas where the factors of disadvantage are concentrated and 
areas where the resources (and their externalities) are channelled by the policy. 
These fundamental mismatches in the structure of the policy reinforce the hypothesis of Boldrin and 
Canova (2001) that “regional and structural policies serve mostly a redistributional purpose, 
motivated by the nature of the political equilibria upon which the European Union is built”. 
 
2.2 A policy “diluted” by budget and power equilibria 
By the end of the 1960s the idea of an EU-level regional development policy emerged from the EU 
political debate. In 1969 the European Commission took the political initiative for the establishment 
of a supra-national regional development policy. Such a change in the political mood towards a 
European regional policy might be explained by the increase in regional disparities which came 
along with rapid European growth in the post-war period. However, the absence prior to 1969 of a 
supranational regional policy did not imply the lack of regional development as an area of public 
policy action. On the contrary almost all European Countries pursued  national policies aimed at 
reducing internal regional disparities and promoting economic development: “indeed the 1960s 
were the golden age of development policies at the national level” (Rodriguez-Pose, 2002 p.43).  In 
addition in this area the need of a “supra-nationalisation” was much weaker than in the case of 
agricultural policies where the establishment of the common market necessarily required a supra-
national policy. However, the evolution of the Eu regional development policies went far beyond 
the mere coordination of the development policies pursued at the national level
4 (e.g. in the area of 
the big transnational infrastructures where the need for such coordination is stronger), progressively 
absorbing a larger share of the EU budget at the expenses of the common agricultural policy.  The 
turning point which established this trajectory    was the enlargement of the then European 
Community (EC) to include Denmark, the United Kingdom and Ireland. If the accession of these 
three new countries (and Ireland in particular), sharpened the degree of existing disparities,  the key 
political pressure for the establishment of the EC development policy arrived from the UK which 
put this issue  at the centre of accession negotiations with the EC. “In a Community whose budget 
was heavily skewed towards the support of continental agriculture, the UK, with less than 2 per cent 
of its working population active in the primary sector, considered the establishment of a Regional 
Fund as a way of recovering some of the payments delivered to the EC budget” (Rodriguez-Pose, 
2002 p.44).  The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) was initially designed as a 
subsidiary source of financing for national policies and allocated on the basis of a system of 
national quotas which emphasized its “compensatory” nature rather than being translated into a 
                                                 
4 The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) was initially designed as a subsidiary source of financing for 
national policies and allocated on the basis of a system of national quotas   7 
truly supranational policy. In the 1980s the accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal emphasized 
both Union-wide regional disparities and the demand for a more favourable redistribution of 
financial resources through the EU budget since their agricultural specialisation patterns prevented 
them from taking full advantage of the Agricultural Policy  then  in place in the EU. These new 
members of the Union together with Ireland used their bargaining power within the EU in order to 
increase the expenditure in favour of “poor regions” and “offset the burden of the single market for 
southern countries and other less favoured regions.” (European Commission’s web site, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/intro/regions2_en.htm).   The increase in the resources 
devoted to regional policies was justified as a compensation for the asymmetric distribution of the 
socio-economic costs of the process of integration which seemed to sharpen territorial disparities 
which, in turn, would have been a source of tension among member states (Armstrong and Taylor, 
2000). Since then, the growth (in absolute and relative terms) of structural spending has come along 
with  further integration of the EU and its  subsequent enlargements. However, as Baldwin and 
Wyplosz (2003) put it, “since 1994 the connection between poor nations and structural spending has 
been greatly diluted (as) large parts of Finland and Sweden were designated as eligible, and even 
some Austrian regions, together with all of the former East Germany”(par.9.5). The pressure for 
setting aside of budget resources aimed at financing the eastward enlargement of the EU played an 
important role in the Agenda 2000 reform of the structural funds by forcing a reduction in both the 
areas eligible for assistance and the community initiatives (Armstrong, 2001). Such a reduction was 
inspired by the principle of territorial and financial concentration: the relatively scarce resources 
available for the EU development policies  should have been channelled more specifically where 
they were needed most in order to maximise their effectiveness.  
 
2.3 Where are the funds most needed? Evidence from the literature. 
 
As we have discussed in the previous section the EU regional development policies have, since their 
very beginning, been shaped by the compromise between  “true” development objectives  and the 
need for financial equilibrium in the net-position of the budget. Such a “compromise” might a priori 
have prevented the funds from going where they were needed most. In this section we present the 
factors that the literature focusing on the effect of socioeconomic conditions for regional economic 
performance have shown to be s tructural sources of competitive dis/advantage for the local 
economy. 
Lagging regions in the EU, notwithstanding the profound differences under many respects, share a 
common set of analogous social conditions whose role is emphasized by the economic restructuring   8 
accelerated by the process of European integration  (Rodriguez-Pose 1994 and 1998a). While some 
economic factors (such as capital and technology) seem  more able to adjust  in response to the 
challenges of the EU integration  (by virtue of their relatively higher mobility), social conditions 
tend to  remain  much more stable.  Consequently it is possible to  identify a specific set of 
“structural” conditions that are persistently associated with poor economic performance and that are 
very slow to endogenously adjust. These  factors concern, to different extents, the labour force 
features, the employment of local resources, the demographic structure and change, the 
accumulation of human capital (Rodríguez-Pose 1998b). 
However, the distinctive role of underling socio-economic conditions has been fully appreciated 
when assessed in a theoretical framework where innovation is explicitly considered as the driving 
force of the growth process. When the Romer’s endogenous growth model is reformulated in order 
to explicitly recognise growth as a multivariate process, human capital accumulation but also 
sectoral specialisation of the labour force, migration, university education and geographical location 
emerge as relevant factors for economic performance (Fagerberg et al. 1997; Cheshire and Magrini, 
2000).  
More generally, the role of socio-economic conditions in the translation of innovation into regional 
growth  has been treated in a systematic way by the introduction of the concept of “social filter” 
(Rodriguez-Pose, 1999): the interaction of a complex set of economic, social, political and 
institutional features that makes some regions “prone” and others “averse” to innovation.  
The multifaceted socio-economic conditions of the EU regions are introduced in our analysis by 
mean of a set of variables describing the local socio-economic realm. In particular, the variables 
which seem to be more relevant for shaping the regional responsiveness to economic change are 
those related to three main domains: educational achievements, productive employment of human 
resources and demographic structure (Rodriguez-Pose and Crescenzi, 2005).  
In our perspective, these factors provides a picture of the geography of the structural disadvantage 
of the EU regions, which seems to remain relatively stable over time and able to able to condition 
persistently the resulting economic geography of the Union. As a consequence, it seems reasonable 
that from both an equity and efficiency perspective, the geographical allocation of regional funds 
should follow the spatial structure of these factors. This is true from a spatial equity perspective, 
because such a distribution of resources across regions  should compensate the residents of 
“disadvantaged” regions for their unfavourable starting condition. And this is also reasonable from 
an efficiency  perspective, since addressing the structural sources of competitive disadvantage of 
assisted regions seems the only effective way to promote the full employment of local resources.    9 
In what follows we aim at measuring the “distance” between these structural factor and the actual 
allocation of EU structural funds. 
 
3  Where do the funds in fact go? 
In order to investigate the spatial structure of the allocation of the EU structural funds and their 
relationship with the sources of structural disadvantage discussed in the previous section we will, in 
a first instance, present a descriptive spatial analysis of both these phenomena. This analysis will be 
followed by a model of empirical analysis aimed at singling out the importance (statistical 
significance) of the socio-economic factors in the distribution of the Eu structural funds (Objective 
1 and 2)  under both the 1994-1999 and 2000-2006 programming periods, in order to shed some 
light on the coherence of the policy pursued up to now. 
In this section the methodology followed to pursue such analysis is briefly presented together with 
the corresponding dataset. The empirical results will be discussed in the fourth section. 
 
 
3.1 A measure for the  socio-economic conditions 
The variables which seem to be more relevant for describing the social conditions of a regional 
space are those related to three main domains: educational achievements, productive employment of 
human resources and demographic structure ( Rodriguez-Pose, 1999;  Rodriguez-Pose and 
Crescenzi, 2005). From the first domain, tertiary educational  attainment (of both the population and 
the labour force) and  participation in Lifelong Learning programmes are assumed as a measure for 
the accumulation of skills at the local level. From the second area the percentage of labour force 
employed in agriculture and the long-term component of unemployment are included in the analysis 
in order to capture the amount of human resources excluded from productive employment. On the 
one hand, long term unemployment  represents the incidence of people whose possibilities of being 
productively involved in the labour market  is persistently hampered by  inadequate skills. On the 
other hand, agricultural employment is frequently synonymous of “hidden unemployment” and a 
backward s tructure of the local economy. In addition, from the third area, the percentage of 
population aged between 15 and 24 was considered as a proxy for the flow of new resources 
entering the labour force, thus “renewing” the existing stock of knowledge and skills. These factors 
will be autonomously introduced into the analysis in order to assess their individual weight. 
However, in order to assess their “global” relationship with the allocation of structural funds, while 
minimising the problems of multicollinearity
5, the socio-economic variable are combined by mean 
                                                 
5 Which prevents their simultaneous introduction into the regression equation.   10 
of Principal Component  (PC)  Analysis (Jollifee, 1986).   Following a procedure similar  to 
Rodriguez-Pose and Crescenzi (2005)  the set of variables discussed above is “reduced”  to an 
individual variable able to  preserve as much as possible of the initial information (variability) (see 
Appendix B for the results of the PC analysis and technicalities).  Such procedure allows us to 
handle an individual variable which “summarize” the multifaceted nature of the socio-economic 
conditions of each region. 
 
3.2 The empirical model for the allocation of funds across regions 
This section outlines the empirical model  for the analysis of the role of socio-economic 
disadvantage in determining the allocation of  structural funds. The model aims at reproducing a 
“hidden” decision function of the European policy maker in the allocation of the structural funds 
across regions. Such a “decision function” would reflect the “rationale” of the policy but also the 
political equilibrium reached in the bargaining process between the Commission, the national 
governments, the local governments and the various pressure groups. The estimation of such a 
model, by regressing the per capita regional commitments of the structural funds on the sources of 
socio-economic disadvantage identified above, will allow us to “measure” what is the role of these 
factor in the actual allocation of the funds. A reduced weight of these factors in the allocation 
decision can reflect an overwhelming role of the “power” factors in the design of the policy and 
might be a possible explanation for their reduced impact.  
Two models will be estimated in our empirical analysis. A first model will analyse the allocation of 
Objective 1 and Objective 2 funds separately (Equations 1 and 2), while a second model will 
consider the overall regional distribution of the structural funds (Equation 3). 
Consequently, the first part of the empirical analysis is based on a two-stage Heckman selection 
model (Heckman, 1979; Green 2003). In the first stage the “eligibility” as Objective 1 (Objective 2) 
area is determined. Such a decision is based on specific criteria which should improve the territorial 
concentration of the funds and a priori select the most disadvantaged areas coherently with each 
objective’s “mission”. However, such a decision can,  in fact, reflect the redistributive purposes 
discussed in the previous section. Consequently, the first step of the Heckman selection model aims 
at assessing,  through a probit model,  how t he factors of socio-economic disadvantage in fact 
influence the probability of a region of being assisted (or not). The model is estimated separately for 
Obj1 regions and for Obj2 regions in both the programming periods considered. 
The estimated model is the following: 
i i i Z w e g + =
'                                                                               (1) 
where    11 
wi=1 if the region i is an assisted region and wi=0 if the region is not assisted; 
and  
) ( ) 1 Pr(
'
i i Z w g F = =  and  ) ( 1 ) 0 Pr(
'
i i Z w g F - = = ; 
where  F(x) is the normal cumulative distribution function, 
i Z is a set of socio-economic 
explanatory variables described above, g is a vector of parameters, and  i e is the error term. 
In a second step the level of support is regressed on its potential determinants while taking into 
account the selection bias introduced in the sample by the a priori selection of eligible areas.  
Consequently, the following second-step H-C OLS model is estimated: 
i i i X y e a + =
'                                                                           (2) 
Where  i y (>0) is the level of per capita commitment in region i, a is a parameter vector, X are the 
explanatory variables and  i e is the error term. 
The set of explanatory variables includes: the socio-economic conditions, a set of national dummy 
variables (to estimate a potential “national” bias in the distribution of the funds) and the Inverse 
Mills Ratio (IMR).  The IMR is calculated from the first stage probit model and is used in the 
second step as an instrument for the latent variable that determines whether an area is eligible or 
not. In other words the IMR links the participation of the regions to the distributions of the funds 
(1
st step) with the amount of funds received (2
nd step). 
The second part of the empirical analysis will focus on how the socioeconomic factors  drive the 
observed level of regional expenditure per capita (Objective 1 and Objective 2). As discussed in the 
previous section of the paper, the interaction of Objective 1 and Objective 2 purposes might further 
“dilute” the policy targeting. 
Consequently, we will estimate an OLS model  regressing the commitment level per capita under 
both Objective 1 and 2 on the socioeconomic variables and a set of national dummy variables: 
i i i X y e a + =
'                                                                               (3) 
Where i y (that this time includes all the regions included in the sample) is the level of per capita 
commitments in region i, a is a parameter vector, X are the explanatory variables (socio-economic 
factors + national dummies) and  i e is the error term. 
 
3.3 The dataset 
Under the constraint of data availably, but also for reasons of homogeneity and coherence in terms 
of relevant institutional level, the analysis is be based upon NUTS1 regions for Germany, Belgium   12 
and the  UK and NUTS2 for all other countries (Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Greece, 
Austria, Portugal, Finland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia). 
Countries without a relevant regional articulation (Denmark, Ireland, Luxemburg, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus) were necessarily excluded from the analysis
6. In addition,  
regional data on  many variables are not available for Sweden.  The data for the socio-economic 
conditions of the EU regions are available from Eurostat and stored in the REGIO databank. The 
data on the regional distribution of commitments
7 for structural funds expenditure was collected by 
the author on the basis of the information provided by the European commission on its website 
(Inforegio) and takes into account all structural funds. In addition we relied upon the Annex of the 
EC report “The impact of structural policies on economic and social cohesion 1989-99”. For the 
sake of comparability between programming periods,  Objective 1 and Objective 6 data on one hand 
and Objective 2 and Objective 5b on the other are combined for 1994-1999 commitments.  
 
4.0 Empirical results 
4.1  Spatial concentration: structural funds vs socio-economic disadvantage 
The analysis of the spatial distribution of the variables is pursued by calculating the value of the 
Moran’s I (see appendix A for technicalities). The Moran’s I is a measure for the global spatial 
autocorrelation of the variables (Cliff and Ord, 1981). When the Moran’s I is significantly different 
from zero the variable of interest exhibits a systematic spatial pattern. A positive value of this index 
means that areas with a high (low) level of per capita structural expenditure tend  to be clustered 
close to other areas with high (low) expenditure. The same line of reasoning is valid for the factors 
of socio-economic disadvantage, where a positive value of the index means a pattern of clustering 
of regions with similar high/low values. The magnitude of the indicator provides a measure for the 
strength of the spatial pattern i.e. the extent of the clustering process of similarly high/low values. 
Table 1 shows the value of the Moran’s I for regional expenditure under Objective 1 and 2  and for 
total structural funds expenditure. The table shows that a clear spatial pattern is identifiable in the 
distribution of both funds and socio-economic conditions. Moran’s I is positive and significant in all 
cases, thus showing a positive spatial autocorrelation: regions with a high (low) level of expenditure 
                                                 
6 As far as specific regions are concerned, no data are available for the French Départments d’Outre-Mer  (Fr9). 
Uusimaa  (Fi16) and Etela-Suomi (Fi17) were excluded from the analysis due to the lack of data on socio-economic 
variables.  Etela-Suomi (Fi17) and Trentino-Alto Adige  (IT31) were excluded from the analysis as they have no 
correspondent in the NUTS2003 classification, thus preventing us from matching data available only in the new NUTS 
classification. Islands (PT2 Açores, PT3 Madeira, FR9 Departments d’Outre-Mer, ES7 Canarias) and Ceuta y Melilla 
(ES 63) were excluded from the analysis as time-distance information, necessary for the computation of spatial weights 
(appendix A), is not available.  
7 Only data for commitments  rather than expenditure are available. However the use of commitments data is coherent 
with our theoretical framework, as we aim at analysing the a priori structure of the policy rather than estimating the 
impact of the actual expenditure.   13 
(socio-economic disadvantage) tend to be clustered together. If the results are examined in further 
details by considering the magnitude of the index, it is possible to note that Objective 1 tends to be 
more concentrated than Objective 2 expenditure where the latter seems to respond more weakly to 
the principle of territorial concentration  (in both the programming periods). However, it must be 
noted that the overall territorial concentration of expenditure has increased after the Agenda 2000 
reform of the structural funds: the Moran’s I for Objective 1, 2 and total expenditure has increased 
from one programming period to the other. However, as we discussed in the previous sections, the 
territorial concentration of the funds should be compared with that of the socio-economic sources of 
competitive disadvantage. This benchmark is provided by the last line of  table 1 which shows the 
Moran’s I for the “Social Factors” variable which is calculated through the Principal Component 
Analysis from the whole set of socio-economic variables previously discussed.  The comparison 
between the magnitude of the Moran’s I of the “Social Factors” and that of structural expenditure 
shows that the former are more spatially concentrated than the latter. Thus, even if the territorial 
concentration of expenditure increased with the reform of the structural funds it seems to be still 
insufficient when compared to the spatial pattern of the sources of structural disadvantage.  
 
4.2  A model for the regional allocation of structural funds 
In the previous paragraph the spatial distribution of the structural funds has been analysed. In what 
follows we discuss the estimation results for our empirical model, which aims at understanding 
more directly the weight of the observed socio-economic factors in the “implicit” decision function 
for the regional allocation of structural funds. Following the specification presented in par. 3.2 we 
estimated the two-stage Heckman selection model for the allocation of  Objective 1 (Tab.2) and 
Objective 2 (Tab.3) funds. The tables show the estimations results for the programming periods 
1994-1999 (on the left hand side of the table) and  2000-2006 (right hand side).  For each 
programming period we estimate the equations (1) and (2) by regressing the funds on the “Social 
Factors” variable (a) and on some its components (b).  
When looking at the results for the Probit Selection Model (lower part of the tables) we should keep 
in mind that the magnitude of the parameters estimated by the probit technique does not have a 
direct meaning in terms of the extent of the corresponding effect. However, they are informative as 
far as their signs and significance is concerned.   
As far as Objective 1 funds are concerned (Tab.2), the social factors variable shows  a negative sign 
and a high significance level in both the programming periods thus implying that favourable socio 
economic conditions (i.e. a high value of the  social factors variable) reduce, as expected, the 
probability of being considered an eligible area (column a). This seems to confirm that the actual   14 
eligibility criteria, based on per capita income, is a  good approximation of the socio-economic 
realm of the local economy. However, if the factors influencing the probability of becoming an 
eligible region are considered in further details (column a), we notice that the “traditional” sources 
of disadvantage are more “rewarded” by this system: the “percentage of labour force concentrated 
in agriculture” and “long term unemployment” significantly increase the chances of becoming an 
Objective 1 region. On the contrary, other sources of disadvantage such as the “the percentage of 
young population” and “tertiary education attainments” are not significant (the former) or much less 
significant (the latter) than other factors.  
In the second step of the model, the amount of funds received (by eligible areas) is analysed 
(Equation 2). The empirical results show that, while significant for the acquisition of the status of 
assisted region, the socio-economic factors are not significant for determining the level of the funds 
received (column a). In other words, the distribution of the funds across the eligible areas does not 
seem to reflect their actual differentiated socio-economic status. When considering the specific 
socio-economic factors (column b) we notice that only the education level variable shows a high 
level of significance in 2000-2006: a relatively higher percentage of tertiary education achievements 
seems to reduce the amount of funds received in favour of less well endowed regions. The national 
dummies seems to highlight a certain degree of nation bias in the allocation of the funds in favour 
of some members states, but this bias seems to disappear when the socio-economic conditions are 
fully accounted for. 
Table 3 presents, in the same way as in the previous table, the results for the estimation of the two-
step Heckman selection for Objective 2 funds.  The results for the probit selection model show that, 
as expected, objective 2 regions tend to  present  relatively more favourable socio-economic 
conditions: the socio-economic factors variable is positive and significant. In addition, as expected, 
objective 2 regions are mainly  industrial regions (an high % agriculture labour force tends to 
reduce the probability of being “selected”) and the population is relatively younger than in other 
areas. However, the present eligibility criteria seem unable to discriminate the areas with relatively 
less abundant  skilled population, as shown by the non-significance of the education variable in 
2000-2006. When we move on to the analysis of the determinants of the amount of funds allocated 
to the regions, we find no sign of any correlation with the underling socio-economic conditions of 
the assisted areas (except for the education variable in 2000-2006). This seems to confirm the 
“compensatory” nature of these financial resources as discussed in the previous sections. 
In table 4 the overall allocation of structural funds under both Objective 1 and 2 is assessed, thus 
focusing upon their interactions and “composition effect” as parts of a single EU policy action.     15 
The results for the regression of the level of structural funds per capita on the socio-economic 
conditions (Equation 3) are presented.  The empirical results show that the overall amount of funds 
allocated to the EU regions partially reflects their underling socio-economic conditions, even if the 
percentage of the overall variability explained by such factors is relatively small (the R -squared  
increase of the regressions increases from 1994-1999 to 2000-2006 but it is still relatively small). 
When considering the specific socio-economic factors influencing the distribution of the funds  we 
notice that agricultural labour force, as a “traditional” source of disadvantage still seems to be the 
main driver of the funds at the expenses, for example, of the level of human capital accumulation 
which, instead, has been shown to be particularly relevant in the context of a knowledge based 
economy. The national dummies, while minimising the problem of spatial autocorrelation, highlight 
a  certain degree of  national bias in the distribution of the funds in favour of  the “cohesion 
countries”. A bias which,  in the 1994-1999 period, has particularly favoured Germany as well. 
 
5.0 Conclusions: a hardly surprising performance 
This essay has combined two different strands of literature by comparing a set of socio-economic 
conditions (which have been proven responsible for hampering the economic success of many EU 
regions) with the regional allocation of structural funds.  
The theoretical discussion supported the idea that the EU funds should be allocated in order to 
“compensate” the structural disadvantage of the assisted areas thus maximising their effectiveness. 
However, it also showed how the “redistributional purposes” needed by the EU “political market” 
equilibrium have, in fact, “diluted” the targeting of the funds over the historical evolution of the 
European Union itself. 
Our empirical analysis allowed us to assess the bias in the geographical allocation of the structural 
funds (Objective 1 and 2)  under both the 1994-1999 and 2000-2006 programming periods.  The 
low degree of spatial concentration of the development funds seems to support the hypothesis of a 
distribution based on political equilibrium rather than effectiveness. However, the Agenda 2000 
reform of the structural funds was able to increase the territorial concentration of the funds.  
Where the spatial concentration of EU funds is contrasted with a specifically developed indicator of 
socio-economic disadvantage of the EU regions, the empirical evidence suggests that such 
disadvantage is more concentrated than the associated funds.  
Furthermore, the empirical model  uncovered the weak association of regional funds are with the 
above-mentioned sources of competitive “di-advantage”,  in particular as far as the problem of 
human capital accumulation is concerned.   16 
These empirical results seems to suggest that the reduced impact of the EU regional policy 
(highlighted by the economic literature) might be explained in terms of the a priori allocation of the 
financial resources which seems to suffer from the “political dilution” of the policy objectives.  
 
  
Tab.1 - Objective 1 and Objective 2 Funds per capita, 1994-1999 
and 2000-2006; Social Factors variable. 
Variables  I  E(I)  sd(I)  z  p-value* 
  Programming Period 1994-1999 
Objective1  0.102  -0.008  0.009  11.649  0 
Objective 2  0.039  -0.008  0.009  5.061  0 
Total expenditure  0.095  -0.008  0.009  10.929  0 
  Programming Period 2000-2006 
Objective1  0.142  -0.008  0.009  15.911  0 
Objective 2  0.094  -0.008  0.009  10.781  0 
Total expenditure  0.149  -0.008  0.009  16.658  0 
           
Social Factors+  0.223  -0.008  0.009  24.329  0 
*1-tail test           
 
*This variable is the linear combination of the socio-economic variables described in the text and is calculated through the Principal Component Analysis  
Tab.2 - Heckman Selection model, Objective 1 Funds per capita, 1994-1999 and 2000-2006. 
  Programming Period 1994-1999    Programming Period 2000-2006 
  Equation (2)    Equation (2) 
Variables  Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|z|    Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|z|    Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|z|    Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|z| 
  (a)        (b)        (a)        (b)     
Social 
Factors*  3622.424  21602.14  0.867            1218.957  10951.03  0.911         
Education          -4988.11  2562.976  0.052            -1913.78  456.1678  0 
Agriculture          -1348.16  1043.342  0.196            -312.165  222.0423  0.16 
L.T.Unempl.          -574.539  588.8321  0.329            -89.498  110.8817  0.42 
Young Pop           -3218.96  2456.867  0.19            -1067.57  503.5399  0.034 
National 
Dummies                               
de   1286.602  3153.09  0.683    1044.413  362.087  0.004    264.6077  1293.069  0.838    291.6251  68.56178  0 
it   10.02819  2446.981  0.997    -119.275  215.7996  0.58    83.11813  1066.923  0.938    49.53745  46.58662  0.288 
at   198.3732  3683.407  0.957    309.7738  279.0372  0.267    142.7548  1579.302  0.928    180.4558  60.11469  0.003 
be   498.6349  3469.236  0.886    281.757  304.0943  0.354    100.9242  1514.511  0.947    95.4871  62.36345  0.126 
pt   -248.376  2651.336  0.925    -362.557  186.396  0.052    157.058  1134.62  0.89    123.3903  38.62917  0.001 
nl   512.8831  3378.771  0.879    369.2325  316.798  0.244    122.9396  1487.263  0.934    134.3599  66.7445  0.044 
uk   745.6835  3216.694  0.817    398.8849  227.0967  0.079    193.8667  1310.763  0.882    129.0245  43.20416  0.003 
es   621.0167  2306.694  0.788    634.0799  288.4948  0.028    252.0606  997.5152  0.801    319.0792  59.05076  0 
gr   192.1769  2456.519  0.938    224.2701  187.8398  0.233    -21.8073  1054.395  0.983    -1.55839  39.39773  0.968 
fi   534.0902  2926.159  0.855    233.248  286.6558  0.416    0.204899  1271.065  1    -32.9576  57.13414  0.564 
Constant  3561.73  14885.26  0.811    2025.47  659.4408  0.002    1614.26  11007.22  0.883    574.4937  137.1147  0 
  Probit Selection Model (Equation 1)    Probit Selection Model (Equation 1) 
Social 
Factors*  -1.41589  0.348857  0            -1.03702  0.329578  0.002         
Education          5.044067  2.89385  0.081            5.754955  2.826307  0.042 
Agriculture          17.32992  3.535073  0            15.12283  3.218646  0 
L.T.Unempl.          3.435833  1.171702  0.003            2.609007  1.091462  0.017 
Young Pop           5.912144  4.973609  0.235            6.068956  4.78766  0.205 
Constant  0.265963  0.17737  0.134    -4.737  1.13581  0    0.16692  0.172587  0.333    -4.25439  1.07249  0 
  Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR)    Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) 
IMR  -4846.97  23328.48  0.835    -358.795  178.5998  0.045    -2111.38  15897.1  0.894    -65.866  41.52635  0.113 
                               
rho   -1        -1        -1        -0.94973     
sigma   4846.965        358.7948        2111.375        69.35247     
lambda   -4846.97  23328.48      -358.795  178.5998      -2111.37  15897.1      -65.866  41.52635   
 
*This variable is the linear combination of the socio-economic variables described in the text and is calculated through the Principal Component Analysis 
Tab.3 - Heckman Selection model, Objective 2 Funds per capita, 1994-1999 and 2000-2006. 
  Programming Period 1994-1999    Programming Period 2000-2006 
  Equation (2)    Equation (2) 
Variables  Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|z|    Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|z|    Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|z|    Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|z| 
  (a)        (b)        (a)        (b)     
Social 
Factors*  41.24806  979.3314  0.966            15.24312  360.1518  0.966         
Education          -1473.4  2604.039  0.572            -219.959  86.8514  0.011 
Agriculture          -2313.08  5708.642  0.685            146.9052  213.0774  0.491 
L.T.Unempl.          -292.403  1097.94  0.79            45.70872  53.61375  0.394 
Young Pop   |         -2649.94  4296.254  0.537            -95.0998  299.439  0.751 
National 
Dummies                               
de  -14.1343  61.11901  0.817    -21.8045  131.9588  0.869    -15.2183  25.85857  0.556    -16.5432  5.622292  0.003 
it  13.79382  83.21526  0.868    18.6619  147.3966  0.899    -41.2794  38.36847  0.282    -43.8702  7.736061  0 
at  -31.6908  69.25755  0.647    42.80739  211.879  0.84    -20.1437  27.39351  0.462    -5.56321  9.046899  0.539 
be  -4.40015  124.5079  0.972    -54.1565  220.7587  0.806    -6.2263  61.19157  0.919    -17.4202  11.50549  0.13 
nl  74.98787  81.38781  0.357    116.1177  221.6512  0.6    1.86291  43.41586  0.966    -1.35525  12.65517  0.915 
uk  51.9274  82.03706  0.527    46.94875  139.8897  0.737    15.96409  35.93839  0.657    6.896866  6.055499  0.255 
es  151.6018  72.02708  0.035    123.0932  218.1189  0.573    25.25797  30.96621  0.415    20.99423  10.78373  0.052 
fi  77.1801  113.6932  0.497    70.01067  235.5529  0.766    -28.5619  49.59434  0.565    -33.2919  11.58116  0.004 
Constant  -66.0253  1528.65  0.966    726.9151  1291.69  0.574    -34.9188  511.2596  0.946    52.246  67.34726  0.438 
  Probit Selection Model (Equation 1)    Probit Selection Model (Equation 1) 
Social 
Factors*  1.121132  0.330526  0.001            1.331961  0.343357  0         
Education          -7.02116  2.844077  0.014            -3.15919  2.750046  0.251 
Agriculture          -16.0497  3.350845  0            -14.7694  3.387493  0 
L.T.Unempl.          -3.23574  1.131636  0.004            -3.56761  1.134586  0.002 
Young Pop   |         -10.283  4.739716  0.03            -19.6541  5.100463  0 
Constant  -0.22104  0.173643  0.203    5.339909  1.114868  0    -0.38479  0.178404  0.031    6.028806  1.164758  0 
  Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR)    Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) 
IMR  214.6384  1720.033  0.901    363.2897  714.9973  0.611    96.03772  517.8416  0.853    1.456141  28.80728  0.96 
rho   1        1        1        0.11154     
sigma   214.6384        363.2897        96.03772        13.05521     
lambda   214.6384  1720.033      363.2897  714.9973      96.03772  517.8416      1.456141  28.80728   
 
*This variable is the linear combination of the socio-economic variables described in the text and is calculated through the Principal Component Analysis  
Tab.4 - Heteroskedasticity-Consistent OLS model, Objective 1 and Objective 2 Funds per capita, 1994-1999 and 2000-2006. 
  Programming Period 1994-1999    Programming Period 2000-2006 
Variables  Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|t|    Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|t|    Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|t|    Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|t| 
Social Factors*  -327.894  129.8615  0.013            -162.214  42.01456  0         
Education          771.8936  863.6608  0.373            -10.0642  231.26  0.965 
Agriculture          1846.892  566.4197  0.001            703.0175  195.4019  0 
L.T.Unempl.          363.4748  264.9683  0.173            119.7216  81.18214  0.143 
Young Pop   |         3029.142  1395.854  0.032            1200.057  494.6487  0.017 
National Dummies                         
de   294.7922  111.1332  0.009    205.139  81.83613  0.014    65.45534  27.4801  0.019    35.56319  20.35761  0.083 
it   57.38723  80.60264  0.478    46.11072  96.23988  0.633    -9.09578  27.36722  0.74    -22.1725  26.60234  0.406 
at   -37.8744  63.17935  0.55    -71.8916  99.93928  0.473    -17.1091  25.62074  0.506    -40.7265  37.53585  0.28 
be   153.1352  100.7441  0.131    -15.7337  119.9024  0.896    54.42931  26.19563  0.04    -2.24039  30.53526  0.942 
pt   -58.9707  73.48608  0.424    -69.3652  93.02556  0.457    179.3968  42.1867  0    167.1739  52.87925  0.002 
nl   91.98157  61.66183  0.138    -194.286  107.3449  0.073    20.23761  19.88387  0.311    -95.4172  36.32245  0.01 
uk   214.5534  83.53881  0.011    60.30519  56.59665  0.289    102.6423  27.09222  0    33.96666  22.9845  0.142 
es   460.8256  87.2242  0    130.3368  130.6492  0.321    173.652  36.87841  0    50.1997  47.33312  0.291 
gr   348.8422  96.97734  0    61.27249  152.8804  0.689    -9.13357  25.41967  0.72    -114.086  52.04321  0.03 
fi   233.367  83.44499  0.006    82.88095  102.4067  0.42    -15.2933  10.75426  0.158    -78.7236  27.42229  0.005 
Constant  247.3297  60.25865  0    -596.29  307.5034  0.055    111.9031  18.47053  0    -178.189  89.55031  0.049 
                               
R-squared  0.37        0.46        0.46        0.56     
F-stat  8.71        5.47        17.38        7.62     
Prob.  0.000        0.000        0.000        0.000     
 
 
*This variable is the linear combination of the socio-economic variables described in the text and is calculated through the Principal Component Analysis   17 
APPENDIX A -  The weight matrix and the Moran’s I 
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Where wij  is a sequence of normalised weights that relate observation i to all the other 
observations j in the data. Values of I larger (smaller) than the expected value E(I)=-1/(n-1) signal 
the presence of positive (negative) spatial autocorrelation. 












where dij is the average trip-length (in minutes) between region  i and j calculated by the IRPUD 
(2000) for the computation of the Peripherality Indicators and made available by the European 
Commission. 
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